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1. INTRODUCTION 
The benefit a country can extract from good education is a general consensus nowadays. 
The most important examples of countries that achieved economic development in the 
recent decades – South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong – are associated to 
robust investment in primary education. So, improving the quality of education is the 
key to break the underdevelopment and to reduce inequality and social exclusion.  
Bruns, Evans and Luque (2012) identified many positive externalities of 
education. For these authors, a good system of education may lead to:  
 
(1) developing the labor force skills for sustained economic 
growth; (2) contributing to poverty and inequality reduction by 
providing educational opportunity for all; and (3) transforming 
education spending into educational results, especially student 
learning. (Bruns; Evans & Luque, 2012) 
 
Analyzing the Brazilian context, Menezes-Filho (2001) demonstrated that 
education is responsible for 26 percent salary difference between educated and not 
educated workers, and 40 percent of this gap when we weight by the number of hours 
worked. These numbers have generated growing concerns when one takes into account 
the most recent data on education in Brazil released by the Program for International 
Student Assessment - PISA in 2009. PISA reveals that Brazilian students perform rather 
poorly in comparative perspective, ranked 54th position among 65 countries. The Figure 
1 shows that, although Brazil has improved its score on PISA in the last decade, its 
outcome is still worse than other developing countries like China or Poland as well as 
other Latin American countries such as Chile and Mexico. 
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Figure 1: PISA MATH PERFORMANCE FOR BRAZIL AND SELECT 
COUNTRIES. 
 
Source: OECD. Elaboration by Bruns, Evans and Luque (2012) 
 
Barros et al (2010) show that half of the recent decline in inequality in Brazil is 
due to changes in the distribution of labor earnings. The fall in labor income inequality, 
in turn, was primarily due to the fall in inequality in the distribution of labor income per 
working adult. On the other hand, they also show that the accelerated expansion of 
education over the last decade may have played an important role in reducing overall 
inequality. One factor that may explain this trend could be changes in access to 
education. The last decade was marked by an accelerated expansion of education in 
Brazil, more than twice as fast as the one that occurred in the 1980s. Estimates from 
PNAD show that in the last decade the average schooling of the Brazilian labor force 
increased by almost two completed grades, while in the previous decade the increase 
was of 0.7 completed grades. The authors argue that over half of the reduction in 
extreme poverty in 2001-2007 in Brazil was due to the reduction in income inequality 
(p. 137). Income inequality, in turn, decreased partly because of increasing access to 
education (p. 154). In their view increasing access to education decreases income 
inequality through three mechanisms: a decline in fertility; an increase in female labor 
force participation; and a reduction in labor income inequality (p. 154).  
Thus, if Brazil has the ambition to become a develop country in the near future, 
it is necessary to improve performance of the Brazilian’s public school. The 
fundamental question is, how do it?  
Several scholars and theories have tried to understand how to improve the 
primary education by many differences factors. Oliveira, Dourado and Santos (2007), 
	   3	  
for instance, has demonstrated that the instruments required to improve education 
performance are associated with two dimensions: (i) extra-school dimension 
(socioeconomic and cultural and citizen’s rights and state obligation) and (ii) intra-
school dimension (education infrastructure, school management practice, teacher level 
and student level). 
It is now a common wisdom the role-played by these instruments. An important 
funding program of the education public system particularly designed to backing these 
instruments is de FUNDEB (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação 
Básica e de Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação). FUNDEB has been the main 
source of funding for basic public education in Brazil, especially at the municipal level. 
The fund consists of contributions (% of tax) made by federal government, states and 
municipalities. These contributions is distributed to states and municipalities based on 
number of student enrolled in public schools in a municipality. Thus, FUNDEB aims at 
reducing education inequalities between different regions of the country generated by 
social and economic differences.  
  FUNDEB was instituted in 2007 is an evolution of FUNDEF (Fundo de 
Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental). FUNDEF was created in 1998 and it 
performed an important role substantially increasing the expansion of primary 
education. After the implementation of this fund, almost all schoolchildren were 
enrolled. The difference between the FUNDEF and the FUNDEB is that whereas the 
former provided scale of children’s access to public schools the latter fundamentally 
expanded the contribution and destination of the resources. Another distinction is that 
the FUNDEF contemplates the primary school only, whereas the FUNDEB also 
includes the secondary school, pre-primary education and adult and youth education in 
addition to primary school. 
  The FUNDEF and FUNDEB have had a considerable impact, especially in the 
Brazilian poor cities and states. Their main effects can be identified on teachers’ salaries 
given that 60 percent of these funds are spent with schoolteachers. The remainder has 
been allocated in other education cost. Figure 2 shows that FUNDEB increase 
significantly the fund’s revenue comparatively with FUNDEF.    
  
Figure 2: FUNDEF/FUNDEB EXPENDITURES 1998-2010 (in billions of constant 
2010 Reais) 
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Source: National Treasury 
 
However, FUNDEB’s redistribution program does not generate the same 
outcome among states and municipalities, even those that have similar economic and 
social conditions. In fact, municipalities and states have different educational 
performance even with similar amount of resources transferred by the national 
government. What does account for these differences in educational performance? We 
also claim that in addition to those above-mentioned environmental and financial 
aspects, the quality of institutions, especially those responsible to check the political 
behavior of policymakers and politicians, have a direct impact on quality of public 
policies, including education (Melo and Pereira 2013). These authors also demonstrate 
that the degree of political competition matters to explain how governors at the 
subnational level behave predatorily or variously once in power in Brazil. However, 
they highlight that the positive effect of political competition of policy outcome is 
conditioned by the degree of institutionalization of checks and balance institutions.  
Therefore, in addition to descriptively show the distinct profiles and different 
performances Brazilian states present as a result of the FUNDEB program, the objective 
of this study also tests the impact of the quality of checks and balances institution and 
political competition on the performance of primary schools at subnational level in 
Brazil. Our preliminary econometric exercises indicate that quality of checks and 
balance institutions provides a governance-enhancing effect on the quality of primary 
school at the state level in Brazil. 
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2. THEORY 
The existing vast literature discusses different aspects that might impact on education 
performance. In fact, this literature highlights the diversity and the complexity of factors 
that may influence on education. Thus, it seems impossible to analyze the determinants 
of the improvement of student apprenticeship looking at to one perspective only. As 
mentioned before, Oliveira et al. (2007) identified two dimensions that influence the 
quality of education (extra-school and intra-school) in the Brazilian context.  
 These authors make use of reports from UNESCO and from the World Bank to 
produce these dimensions. As the World Bank plays an important role in the diffusion 
of policy guidelines, it has stimulated countries to adopt the “best practice” in areas like 
education (Silva, Azzi and Bock, 2008). They named two factors as extra-school 
dimension: (i) socioeconomic and cultural, and (ii) citizen’s rights and State obligation. 
The intra-school dimension has others four factors: (i) education infrastructure (ii) 
school management practice (iii) teacher level, and (iv) student level.  
 
Extra-school dimension 
• Socioeconomic and cultural 
This aspect comprises cultural, social and economic conditions of families and students. 
The literature has many contributions showing evidence of positive relations between 
socio-economic status of families and students’ performance (Sirin, 2005; White, 1982). 
This relation is largely attributable the role of family in the scholar life of students. 
Davis-Kean and Sexton (2009), for instance, affirm that parents that have a high 
educational level have the conditions to offer a better home environment to learning 
process to their children. 
Ribeiro and Menezes Filho (2009) demonstrate that variables related of family 
structure represent 70 percent of the variation of students’ grades. Among them, the 
authors emphasize the role played by parent’s scholarship. In a different view, Soares 
and Marotta (2009) claim that social segregation of schools explains the variation in 
students’ performance. This debate is relevant because, even considering that the 
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family’s participation has a large impact on student performance, the school and 
education policies would have greater difficulties to improve the quality of education.  
 
• Citizen’s rights and state obligation 
The most important aspect with regard to the amplification of citizen’s rights 
and state obligation was the expansion of primary education in the last two decades in 
Brazil. According to Oliveira (2007), increasing access to schools is a strong indicator 
of improvement in education’s quality in recent years. However, the education 
expansion in Brazil has had a negative impact in school performance in the mid-90s. 
Figure 2 shows that Brazilian Math Proficiency performance in basic education 
worsened after 1997, especially as a consequence of the intensification of access to 
schools, and started to improve after 2001 only. 
Figure 3: Brazilian Math Proficiency on SAEB/Prova Brazil, 1995-2009 
 
Source: INEP. Elaboration by Bruns, Evans and Luque (2012) 
 
The majority of these enrolled children come from poor areas and they do not 
have family incentives to improve their performance at school. In this environment the 
rates of school evasion and failure are not low (FONSECA, 2009). Figure 4 shows that 
the primary education in Brazil covers about 100 percent of children and more than 60 
percent have finished the secondary education in 2009. The performance rate is 
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remarkably different than 1993, when less than 30 percent had finished the secondary 
education. 
Figure 4: CHANCE IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN BRAZIL, 1993 – 
2009 (PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION AGE 26 – 30) 
 
Source: PNAD. Elaboration by Bruns, Evans and Luque (2012) 
  The expansion of the quality of education seems to be the biggest challenge of 
Brazil nowadays, given that almost schoolchildren have been formally enrolled. 
Nevertheless, the performance of Brazilian public education system seems worsened 
when compared with other developing countries. Another issue has to do with the lack 
of an incentive structure to keep children in school in for them to finish the secondary-
level.  
 
Intra-school dimension 
• Education infrastructure 
Scholars also affirm that the quality of schools’ infrastructure affects the performance of 
students (OLIVEIRA, DOURADO & SANTOS, 2007). This is an interesting argument 
given that computers with access to Internet, comfortable classroom and good quality of 
nutrition contributed to a better environment in the school and, consequently, better 
performance of student. However, the provision of good quality of education 
infrastructure has an elevated cost, which most of the time demands high investments.  
Brazil’s public spending on education, in 2007, was 5.2 percent of GDP, which 
is greater than OECD average, about 4.8 percent of GDP (Bruns; Evans & Luque, 
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2012). If resources implies positives returns in the quality of education, and Brazil 
provides high investment when compared with developed countries in percent of GDP, 
why then Brazil does not have a good education system? (Bruns, Evans and Luque, 
2012; Veloso, 2009).  
As the Brazilian GDP per capita is lower than OECD countries, the investments 
in absolute terms are inferior. Other issue about education investment in Brazil is that 
the country spends by far more money with students in public universities. In 2010, 
Brazilians governments (federal government, states and municipalities) spent US$ 2.653 
per student in primary school and US$ 13.137 with student in university. Figure 3 
shows this incoherent allocation of public resources. 
Figure 3: SPENDING PER STUDENT AT DIFFERENT EDUCATION LEVELS 
RELATIVE TO UNIT COSTS IN PRIMARY EDUCATION, OECD AND 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 2007 
 
 
Source: OECD. Elaboration by Bruns, Evans and Luque (2012) 
 
• School management practice 
Menezes Filho (2012) claims that the practice of good management of schools does 
make difference in the quality of education. The author demonstrates his argument 
relying on the example of the municipality of Sobral. This city, located in the northeast 
of Brazil, in the state of Ceará (one of the poorest of Brazil), increased its quality of 
education, measured by the IDEB (Brazilian Index of Education) in 60 percent between 
2005 and 2009. To achieve this outstanding performance, the city closely monitored 
schools with assessments of students’ improvement. Other factors that 
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helped to improve the quality of education in Sobral’s schools were the following: (i) 
continuing competencies development of teachers, (ii) school managers are chosen by 
meritocratic system, (iii) an efficient distribution of teaching-learning materials in all 
schools and (iv) an incentive-structure of extra-payment to teachers based on their 
performance. 
The students’ assessments like PISA, PROVA BRASIL, and ENEM are 
important to measures of the quality of education. They also serve as education target. 
Therefore, these assessments are relevant information to create new policies in 
education and improve the existing policies. As we will discuss later, students’ 
performance on those exams (IDEB/PROVA BRASIL) will be used as the dependent 
variable in out empirical exercises.  
 
• Level of School Teachers  
Many studies argue that teachers have a great influence on the performance of students, 
especially in their exams (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Rowan, Correnti, & Miller, 
2002). However, teachers do not enjoy a high social status when they are compared for 
instance with doctors, lawyers or engineers. Thus, the best professionals lack incentives 
to pursue a professional career as a teacher in Brazil (Bruns; Evans & Luque, 2012). In 
this context, it is possible to find many programs of pay-for-performance. However, the 
bonus has a limited motivation effect (Heneman, 1998; Kelley, 1999). In Brazil, the 
state of Minas Gerais has adopted the pay-for-performance incentive-structure 
mechanism in the education. Minas Gerais has presented good outcomes; however, we 
it is hard to demonstrate a causal effect this improvement in quality of education as a 
result of the pay-for-performance mechanism. 
Therefore, the key challenge is how to motivate teachers to work better. Higher 
salaries and better status of career may thus improve teachers’ performance. In addition, 
Setubal (2010) emphasis other methods to improve the quality of teaches’ job. The 
author shows the importance of professor training and pedagogical support. 
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• Students’ level 
Education provides higher and more consistent returns children are young (Carneiro, 
Cunha & Heckman, 2003). If it is the case, the Brazil’s strategy with regard to 
education investment is mistaken. Resources should be invested in primary and 
secondary school rather than in the university. A key issue concerning student’s level is 
the evasion from schooling. Neri (2009) discusses few reasons that may justify why 
children prefer no to go to school: (i) difficult access to school, (ii) children need to 
work, and (iii) no interest. 
 
• Quality of institutions and political competition 
As mentioned before, Pereira and Mello (2013) argue that the quality of checks 
and balances institutions has a strong impact on the choices of governors make 
to allocate public resources and the provision of public goods. If checks and 
balance institutions play a relevant role decreasing, for instance, politicians’ 
wealth variation or decreasing state’s primary deficit, it is reasonable to infer a 
similar positive effect of the quality of institutions on education policies at the 
subnational level. So, the first hypothesis is the following: 
H1: the quality of checks and balance leads to better education’s policies outcome. 
  
Melo and Pereira (2013) have also demonstrate that political competition leads 
to governance-enhancing politicians’ behavior. However, it’s positive effect is 
conditioned by the quality of checks and balance institutions. So, here we have the 
following second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Strong political competition when combined with better-institutionalized checks 
and balances institutions lead to a better supply of education policies. 
 
  We will test these hypotheses in the Brazilian’s states. Those econometric 
exercises are possible because there is a great institutional similarity in the Brazilian’s 
states constitutional level, which allow conditions a comparative assessment. On the 
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other hand, Brazilian states present distinct features with regard to the quality of checks 
and balance institutions, social economics development, political competition and, 
above all, education policy outcomes. 
3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ABOUT BRAZILIAN STATES 
 
In Brazil, social inequalities are huge. These inequalities are present both at the local 
and at the regional level. At the municipal level, neighborhoods with large infrastructure 
coexist with areas of extreme poverty, where people live in very precarious urban 
situations. At the regional level, there is a large discrepancy of income and quality of 
life between the Brazilians south and central regions when compared with North and 
Northeast of the country. These inequalities, between Brazilians regions and states, can 
be observed in table 1, which shows the per capita household income (2010) and GINI 
coefficient 2009. 
 
TABLE 1: DESCREPTIVE STATISTICS: POPULATION, PER CAPITA 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME, INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION AND GINI 2009 
State Population 
Per capita 
household 
income 
(2010) 
Investment in 
education 
(Primary and 
Secondary school 
– Brazilian 
Reais) 
GINI 2009 
Acre  733.559   471.00   3,269.33 0.610861013 
Alagoas  3.120.494   378.00   2,070.23 0.571957908 
Amapá  669.526   525.00   3,729.39 0.509543386 
Amazonas 3.483.985   457.00   1,868.07 0.519111355 
Bahia  14.016.906   423.00   1,766.94 0.556492009 
Ceará  8.452.381   395.00   2,759.14 0.544290579 
Distrito Federal  2.570.160   1.404.00   4,834.43 0.62391278 
Espírito Santo  3.514.952   691.00   3,687.37 0.531619146 
Goiás  6.003.788   685.00   2,691.80 0.510106104 
Maranhão  6.574.789   319.00   2,033.48 0.538340414 
Mato Grosso  3.035.122   652.00   2,510.95 0.512881115 
Mato Grosso do Sul  2.449.024   676.00   3,481.96 0.521173246 
Minas Gerais  19.597.330   641.00   2,445.80 0.504399901 
Pará  7.581.051   383.00   2,006.35 0.510502601 
Paraíba  3.766.528   412.00   1,802.39 0.591369278 
Paraná  10.444.526   747.00   2,301.10 0.554151058 
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Pernambuco  8.796.448   442.00   2,157.11 0.55485264 
Piauí  3.118.360   367.00   2,120.53 0.497377554 
Rio de Janeiro 15.989.929   861.00   2,773.33 0.542411402 
Rio Grande do Norte 3.168.027   475.00   2,038.18 0.559130832 
Rio Grande do Sul  10.693.929   810.00   2,369.02 0.509390809 
Rondônia  1.562.409   566.00   2,410.95 0.519735163 
Roraima  450.479   556.00   4,365.37 0.499892169 
Santa Catarina  6.248.436   843.00   2,052.57 0.459688803 
São Paulo  41.262.199   887.00   2,930.56 0.576355395 
Sergipe  2.068.017   453.00   3,111.59 0.489408007 
Tocantins  1.383.445   512.00   2,946.82 0.523317786 
Source: IBGE 
Table 1 also shows the public investment in education by states. In this Table, 
we can also observe that there is no homogeneity with regard to investments in 
education among Brazilian states. Scholars of education theories argue that there is not 
direct causality between investments and better performance. Figure 4 confirms this 
expectation by showing that state investment in education is not correlated with 
education performance measured by IDEB (Índice de Desenvolvimento da Educação 
Básica – Index of schools and students performance).  
The IDEB was created in 2005 aiming at measuring the quality of education in 
Brazil. This is an indicator of educational quality that combines information on 
performance in standardized tests (Prova Brazil or SAEB) and information about school 
absenteeism. The Brazil National Test (Prova Brasil) and Evaluation System of Basic 
Education (Saeb) are standardized exams and socioeconomic questionnaires produced 
by the ministry of education. 
 
FIGURE 4: INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION AND IDEB (PRIMARY SCHOOL 
– 5TH GRADE) 
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Source: INEP-MEC. 
The Prova Brasil is applied in fifth and ninth grades of primary school and in the 
last grade of high school. Students answer questions about Portuguese language (focus 
on reading) and mathematics (focus on solving problems). In the socioeconomic 
questionnaire, students provide information about their context in school and at their 
homes. Teachers and schools principals also answer the questionnaires to collect 
information about demographic, professional profile, and working conditions of 
schools. Table 2 shows the IDEB score in states schools, in which it is possible to see 
that there are considerable differences in schools grades between states. The literature 
on education performance shows that GDP per capita has a positive influence in the 
quality of education. This seems to be a factual for the Brazilian states. 
TABLE 2: Descriptive statistics (Ideb and checks and balances index) 
State 
IDEB (2011) 
Primary 
school (5th 
grade) 
IDEB (2011) 
Primary 
school (9th 
grade) 
IDEB (2011) 
Secondary 
school (3th 
grade) 
C&B 
Index 
2003-
2006 
Acre  4.6 4.2 3.4 0.146 
Alagoas  3.8 2.9 2.9 0.183 
Amapá  4.1 3.7 3.1 0.247 
Amazonas 4.3 3.8 3.5 0.315 
Bahia  4.2 3.3 3.2 0.454 
Ceará  4.9 4.2 3.7 0.258 
Distrito Federal  5.7 4.4 3.8 0.671 
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
3,5 4 4,5 5 5,5 6 6,5
Investment	  	  (Brazilian	  Reais)
IDEB	  2011	   (Primary	  school -­‐ 5th	  grade)
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Espírito Santo  5.2 4.2 3.6 0.506 
Goiás  5.3 4.2 3.8 0.4 
Maranhão  4.1 3.6 3.1 0.043 
Mato Grosso  5.1 4.5 3.3 0.377 
Mato Grosso do Sul  5.1 4 3.8 0.585 
Minas Gerais  5.9 4.6 3.9 0.519 
Pará  4.2 3.7 2.8 0.242 
Paraíba  4.3 3.4 3.3 0.161 
Paraná  5.6 4.3 4 0.402 
Pernambuco  4.3 3.5 3.4 0.483 
Piauí  4.4 4 3.2 0.059 
Rio de Janeiro 5.1 4.2 3.7 0.728 
Rio Grande do Norte  4.1 3.4 3.1 0.029 
Rio Grande do Sul  5.1 4.1 3.7 1 
Rondônia  4.7 3.7 3.7 0.318 
Roraima  4.7 3.7 3.6 0.049 
Santa Catarina  5.8 4.9 4.3 0.545 
São Paulo  5.6 4.7 4.1 0.684 
Sergipe  4.1 3.3 3.2 0.345 
Tocantins  4.9 4.1 3.6 0.159 
Source: INEP-MEC 
However, how can one explain the difference between states with similar per 
capita household income? Alagoas and Ceará, for instance, have very similar income 
(378 and 395 Brazilian Reais, respectively). In Ceará, the IDEB is 4.9, whereas the 
Alagoas’ IDEB is 3,8 in primary school. In Brazilian southeast, the more developed 
region of Brazil, it is also possible to find analogous differences between income and 
education performance. Even the state of Rio de Janeiro, which has a per capita income 
higher than Minas Gerais, its IDEB is considerably lower than Minas Gerais’ (5.1 and 
5.9, respectively). Figure 5 demonstrates the difference in educational performance in 
states that present similar GDP per capita. 
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FIGURE 5: Per capita household income and IDEB 2011 (primary schools)
 
Source: INEP-MEC and IBGE. 
 
We believe that one of the reasons that might explain part of this variation in the 
outcome of schools in Brazilian states is related to quality of institutions at state level. 
We claim that the development of checks and balances mechanisms has a direct 
influence on the quality and supply of public policies, including education ones. Table 2 
also shows an index of checks and balance that will be used to test our theory. This 
checks and balance index use seven sub-indexes (Melo and Pereira 2013). 
 
TABLE 3: Variables of checks and balance index 
 
Variable Description 
Regulatory Agencies Measures governance of state regulatory agencies 
 
Judiciary Measures by an efficiency index, ratio of number of 
cases tried over cases opened and number of new 
cases opened (per inhabitants) 
Public Prosecutors Expenditures on public prosecutors, Number of 
prosecutors and  per staff (per resident) 
Audit Office level of activity in each state’s Audit Office 
National Justice 
Council (CNJ) 
procedures initiated in each state by the CNJ divided 
by state GDP 
Media Percent of all media concessions in each state not in 
the hands of politicians 
300,0
400,0
500,0
600,0
700,0
800,0
900,0
1.000,0
3,50 4,00 4,50 5,00 5,50 6,00 6,50
Per	  capita	  household	  income	  (BrazilianReais)
IDEB	  2011	   (Primary	  school -­‐ 5th	  grade)
Minas 
Gerais
Rio de Janeiro
Alagoas Ceará
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Civic Community 
índex 
component analysis using (i) voter turnout (1990-
2006), (ii) voto de legenda (1990-2006), and (iii) 
nonprofit sectors workers per capita 
Source: Pereira and Mello (2013) 
 
Preliminary tests that estimate potential correlation between the quality of check 
and balance institutions and education performance (IDEB 2011) suggest that it is the 
case (p-value = 0.006). This preliminary evidence corroborates our assertion that a good 
system of checks and balances leads to better provision of public policies, such as basic 
education. 
 
 
FIGURE 6: CHECKS AND BALANCES AND IDEB (PRIMARY SCHOOL – 5TH 
GRADE) 
Source: INEP-MEC and Pereira e Mello (2013). 
4. DATA AND METHOD 
 
 This very preliminary descriptive findings calls for a more sophisticated analysis. 
That is exactly what we plan develop in the next version of this report. We will use 
econometric exercises to examine de influence of the quality of checks and balance 
institutions and political competition on education performance. We also carry out a 
case study with a benchmark program in education.  
 
Variables of econometrics test: 
0,0
0,3
0,5
0,8
1,0
3,50 4,00 4,50 5,00 5,50 6,00 6,50
C&B	  Index
IDEB	  2011	   (Primary	  school -­‐ 5th	  grade)
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• Dependent variable: IDEB (state school) 
• Independent variable: GDP, Investments, GINI, Checks and Balances, and 
Political Competition  
5. CASE-STUDY 
 
Given that we found preliminary positive estimates between the quality of checks and 
balance institutions on the performance of education at the subnational level in Brazil, 
we are also planning to do carry out a case study of a successful experience on 
education policies in poor areas of the Brazilian northeast.  
The case of the city of Sobral, located in the state of Ceará, Brazilian northeast, is 
particularly interesting to be closely investigated. Sobral, which has the half of the GDP 
per capita of Brazil and 200,000 inhabitants, has surprisingly performed extremely well 
achieving the IDEB greater or equal to 6, which is an extremely high score and 
considered a standard for developed nations according to the Ministry of Education. Out 
of 82 public schools especially dedicated to unprivileged children in the entire country, 
27 are located in Sobral. This is a remarkable achievement for a municipality, whose 
GDP per capita (2012) is about 5.5 thousand current Dollar.  
What does explain this unexpected outcome?  
According to the Secretary of Education of Sobral, Julio Cesar Alexandre, it is not the 
amount of resources that explain this outstanding performance of this mid-size city, 
given that it receives about 26 percent of revenues, which is the minimum necessary 
required in the Brazilian Constitution. In addition to abolish political appointees as 
Directors of public schools in the municipality, Mr. Alexandre highlights that 
managerial techniques, professional qualifications and an incentive-structure aim at 
rewarding the performance of the schools.  
The Sobral revolution on education started when it was created a simple target: 
all students must know how to read. As it is well known, many Brazilian students who 
attend public schools are in fact unable to read or write. The city of Sobral took this 
challenge very seriously in order to change this reality. The education program works in 
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four different levels: (i) students’ level, (ii) teachers’ level, (iii) schools’ level and (iv) at 
the level of the local bureaucracy that works on education.  
• Students’ level: Production of standardized books and reducing truancy. In Sobral, 
the students are responsibility of their teacher, their family and their school. So, if 
one student didn’t go to his classes, one school worker goes to his house to know 
that happed with this child.  
• Teachers’ level: The teachers received training and bonus by performance of 
student’s assessment. If one school has a good performance in the assessments, all 
teachers in this school also received bonus. 
• Schools’ level: Meritocratic selection of school principals (previously, the school 
principals were appointed by the mayor) and autonomy. The school principals have 
financial autonomy (schools can choose where and how they will spend part of your 
budget) and administrative autonomy (the school principals may choose their 
teachers and Coordinators). 
• The municipal bureaucracy of education’s level: to capacity of the bureaucracy to 
work with student’s assessment (performance culture). 
Using these practices, Sobral had a great performance in the IDEB. Figure 8 
shows Sobral’s performance compared to other Brazilian public schools. 
Figure 08: Sobral municipals schools’ IDEB and Brazilian public schools’ IDEB 
(early years) 
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Source: INEP-MEC and Pereira e Mello (2013). 
 
In order to have a more compressive picture of what is going on in Sobral, 
especially with regard to the quality of institutions and managing strategies, we plan to 
develop local field research where we would have the opportunity to collect data and 
information as well as interview decision-makers and local citizens.  
6. DISCUSSION 
 
To be written 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
To be written  
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